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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ] 
ROBERT BRIAN PEDOCKIE, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) App. Ct. No. 20070375-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping, a first 
degree felony. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury on February 20, 
2007. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence often years to life at the 
Utah State Prison. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under the 
pour over provision in U.C.A. §78-2a-3(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD 
ACTS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. "When reviewing a trial court's decision to 
admit evidence under Rule 404(b), we apply an abuse of discretion standard." 
State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). In addition, this court should 
"review the record to determine whether the admission of [prior] bad acts 
evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in the proper exercise 
of that discretion.5" State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6 P.3d 1120 (Utah 
2000)(citations omitted). This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant 
filed a motion to exclude the evidence. (R. 646-52). 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DIDN'T 
RECOMMEND THAT DEFENDANT BE GIVEN 
CREDIT FOR TIME HE HAD SERVED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue presents a question of law which 
this Court should review for correctness. "Because sentencing errors involve 
questions of law, we review for correctness." State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 
384, f 7. This issue was not preserved for appeal. However, the sentence on 
remand violated Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
therefore this issue can be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. ^ 13. 
9 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping. 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of 
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, 
Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention 
or kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 
years and which may be for life; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the 
trier of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated 
kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or 
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the 
commission of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously 
convicted of a grievous sexual offense. 
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court 
finds that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in 
the interests of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the 
court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than: 
i 
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and w Inch may be toi life; or 
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b): 
(i) ten years arid which may be for life; or 
(ii) six years and which may be for life. 
(5) The provisions of Subsection (-]) »|M not apph WIUMI I person is 
sentenced under Subsection (3)(c). 
(6) imprisonment under this section is mandator) in accordance with 
Section 76-3-406. 
§76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set 
aside. 
(1) Where a com iction or sentence has been set aside on direct rex lew or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense 
or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than 
the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence pre\ ioush satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which weie not known to the 
court at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on 
the record the facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence; or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later 
successfully moves to invalidate his conviction in which case the defendant 
and the prosecution stand in the same position as though the plea bargain, 
com iction, and sentence had never occurred. 
§78-2a- 3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) 1 he I ourt ot Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction oi 
interlocutor}7 appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting trom iormal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission. State Tax Commission. School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board uf Trustees, Division of Forestry Fire and State 
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources, Board of Oil Gas. and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the I ourt oi Vppeals trom the Supreme L ourt. 
A 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or 
waste of time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of 
U.C.A. 76-5-302, a first degree felony for an incident that occurred on or about 
January 2, 2001. (R. 001). The Defendant represented himself at a jury trial and 
was convicted on October 4, 2002, of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping, a 
first degree felony. The Defendant was sentenced to a term often years to life 
at the Utah State Prison. The sentence was ordered to run consecutive to 
another prison sentence. The trial court also recommended that he receive 
credit for the time he had served up to that point. (R. 449-50, 901/8-10) 
^ 
The Defendant filed an appeal of his conviction. His conviction was 
overturned in ihis L wuri in biate v. PCUOJKIC -'..' ! * ; v -~ •• . \L •. . 
remanded back to tl ic trial c -o\ n t oi i Ji n le 28, 2006. 1 1 lere were several pre-trial 
-"•-"• '• ' -
;
 -•••*• • •• -]- -vmandsd back to the trial court. Of 
significance to this appeal is a motion m limine asking the court for an order 
prohibiting the State from introducing that Defendant had been in prison, was 
on parole, was a member of the gang Soldiers of Aryan C unure. and indt he 
had a prior histor) lor uomesiiL woiciiu, ,, - -it* •>. . , . , ee:;ne ^.; IKWI 
on Defendant's mo-• -»• * -. **. ,*. ••< '••* ; s r ' ' :. 
A ji u > 2 : »--..*•:- !•: hnj;,,- !^ , :
 alKj February 20 % 2007. 
The Defendant was convicted a second time of the offense of Aggravated 
Kidnapping, a first degree felony. The Defendant was sentenced on April 4, 
2007. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term often years to lire ai the 
V.idh Siaic Vv^oii. i lie sentence was to run consecutive to a previous Alienee. 
The lnal I-MJII did n<»t ei\e him <'ivdit IMI- finie sen ed this time (R v 1x '-^\ 
902/20) 
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on April 6, 2007. 
The Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal on April 18. 200". 'R. 881). 
Counsel also filed a notice of appeal that was date stamped on Ma} e 20o,;\ 
(R. 883) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 2, 2001, Jeanette Nicole Sather ("Nicole") was an 
acquaintance of the Defendant. (R. 466/258). They had been introduced by a 
friend of hers who had been in prison. (R. 466/258-59). In December of 1999, 
Nicole sent the Defendant, who was an inmate at the prison, a birthday card. 
(R. 466/259). The two of them began writing to each other. In the summer of 
2000, the Defendant began receiving home visits. Nicole would go visit him 
on the weekends while the Defendant was at home. (R. 466/261). 
Nicole believed the Defendant was the man of her dreams. (R. 466/262). 
In September of 2000 the Defendant was released from the prison. (R. 
466/263). The two of them became involved in a serious relationship. (R. 
466/263). By November of 2000, the relationship had soured and Nicole was 
trying to figure out a way to get out of the relationship. (R. 466/264). Nicole 
testified that the Defendant was too controlling and domineering for her. (R. 
466/265). 
The Defendant began dating someone else; but he would still call and 
leave messages on Nicole's voice mail, and she would return the calls. (R. 
466/265). Around Christmas of 2000, the Defendant called Nicole and told her 
that people were coming to kill her. (R. 466/267). On January 2, 2001, Nicole 
ended her shift as the general manager at Nickelcade at around midnight. (R. 
466/269). She got in her car and drove home. (R. 466/273). 
Shortly after she arrived home she heard a knock at her door. (R. 
466/276). She looked out the window and noticed the Defendant's truck 
parked in the street. (R. 466/277). She went to the door and while the door 
was locked, she had a conversation with the Defendant through the locked 
door. (R. 467/5-6). Nicole told him to leave because their relationship was 
over. He told her that he just needed to get his rings. (R. 467/6). She 
eventually opened the door and let the Defendant inside her home. She asked 
if anyone was with him, and the Defendant said they were alone. (R. 467/6). 
After the Defendant was inside there was another knock on the door. 
Nicole told the Defendant not to answer the door, but he did anyway. The 
Defendant's cousin, Justin Pedockie, was at the door. (R. 467/7). Justin 
walked into the kitchen and disconnected Nicole's phones and caller I.D. 
Nicole went into her bedroom and retrieved the Defendant's rings. (R. 
467/11). She told the Defendant another ring was in her car. She went outside 
to her car to get the last ring. (R. 467/14). 
She climbed inside her car and retrieved the ring as well as a pocketknife 
that she kept in her car. (R. 467/14-15). She gave the Defendant his ring and 
told him to go. He told her that she was going to go on a ride with them. She 
told him that if he wanted to go for a ride, they'd go in her car. (R. 467/16). 
Defendant told her they were going in his truck and then motioned to 
Justin. Justin exited the truck and he was carrying a "big black gun" with a 
banana clip. (R. 467/16). The Defendant told her she was going to go for a ride 
with them or they'd shoot her right there. (R. 467/18). Nicole got in the truck 
with Justin and the Defendant. She was seated in the middle of the two men. 
(R. 467/18-19). Justin put the gun on his right side between his body and the 
door. (R. 467/19). 
The Defendant drove to 1-15 and got on the freeway heading 
southbound. They drove to Payson. (R. 467/20). During the drive, Nicole 
asked where they were going. The Defendant told her she was going to her 
grave. (R. 467/22). Along the way, the stopped at a Chevron in Lehi to get 
gas. (R. 467/24-26). They eventually returned to the freeway and drove to 
Payson. (R. 467/34). They drove to a farm where the Defendant had 
previously taken Nicole to ride horses. (R. 467/34). The farm was owned by 
the Defendant's girlfriend's parents. Her name was Karen; and at the time of 
the trial, she and the Defendant had apparently married. (R. 467/37). 
They parked the truck and Nicole remained sitting inside it. Justin was 
outside at the front of the truck with the gun. The Defendant was standing 
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outside near the driver's door. Nicole scooted over to the door. She testified 
that she kicked the Defendant and then pulled the door shut. She started the 
truck and put it in gear and began to pull forward. The Defendant opened the 
door from the outside as Nicole was trying to hold it closed. (R. 467/39-40). 
Nicole testified that as soon as she pushed on the gas she heard a 
gunshot and the truck instantaneously stopped. (R. 467/42). She believed that 
Justin had fired the gun. Defendant opened the truck door and climbed inside. 
(R. 467/42). The Defendant put the truck in park and then ran around outside 
the truck. (R. 467/42). Nicole reached inside the glove box and grabbed a cell 
phone. Before she could call anyone the Defendant came back into the truck, 
jumped on top of her and started choking her. (R. 467/43). 
Justin opened the door and said "somebody had to have heard that, let's 
get out of here." (R. 467/44). The Defendant let go of Nicole and they drove 
away. The Defendant drove to Karen's trailer and went inside the trailer for a 
short time. (R. 467/45). When he came out of the trailer Karen was with him. 
(R. 467/53). The Defendant told Justin that they had an alibi, and that Karen 
was going to say that they had been with her that night. (R. 467/55). 
After they left Karen's, the Defendant got back on 1-15 and started 
driving northbound towards Salt Lake. (R. 467/57). The Defendant drove to 
West Valley where he dropped Justin off at his house. (R. 467/59-61). Justin 
took his gun and went inside. (R. 467/61). 
After they dropped Justin off, Nicole asked if she could drive because 
she was concerned with the Defendant's alcohol consumption. The Defendant 
agreed to let her drive. (R. 467/64). She drove back to her house in Ogden and 
parked in her driveway. (R. 467/72). The Defendant grabbed a bag out of the 
back of the truck and then followed Nicole into her house. (R. 467/73). The 
Defendant put Nicole's phones on top of the bag when he took it into her 
house. (R. 467/76). 
Nicole sat on the couch and the Defendant lay on top of her. (R. 
467/77). The Defendant passed out, and Nicole fell asleep. (R. 467/78). The 
next thing Nicole remembered was her alarm going off. The Defendant had 
rolled off of her so she got up and turned her alarm off. (R. 467/78). The 
Defendant remained asleep on the couch for another fifteen or twenty minutes. 
(R. 467/79). 
Nicole noticed the phone so she plugged it in and called a couple of her 
assistant managers to see if she could find someone to cover her shift at work. 
(R. 467/79). She also called some of her friends. One of her friends asked if 
she should call the police. Nicole told her no that she would wind up dead if 
the police were called. (R. 467/81). Nicole was asked by the prosecutor why 
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she didn't want the police called. She testified that at the time she was hanging 
out with the wrong crowd. People who were in and out of prison "and I knew 
what they did to people who called the police, so I was scared. I didn't want 
him to get caught. I wanted him just to go away." (R. 467/81-82). 
After she hung up the phone, the Defendant walked into the kitchen and 
asked her if she called the police on him. (R. 467/82). The prosecutor asked 
Nicole if she was afraid of retaliation if she called the police. Nicole answered, 
"Yeah. He was in a gang in prison, and I hung out with prior to this with quite 
a few of the other people that were in the prison and I knew, you know, what 
they were all capable of doing and what they did to what they call snitches at 
the time." (R. 467/82). 
After the phone call, the Defendant had Nicole go into her room. He 
pulled his penis out and told her to suck it. (R. 467/83). At the same time the 
phone rang so she went to answer the phone. The Defendant followed her. It 
was her friend on the phone. Nicole told her she couldn't talk. (R. 467/83). 
After Nicole hung up the phone, the Defendant made Nicole take her 
clothes off. He then made her turn around and explain what every bruise on 
her body was from. She told him that she got them from work. (R. 467/84). 
The phone rang again. Nicole answered it and it was her friend's mother, 
Sherrie Norris. (R. 467/85-6). The Defendant plugged in another phone and 
listened in on the conversation. (R. 467/86). 
After the conversation with Sherrie Norris ended the Defendant took 
Nicole into her room and told her to get dressed. Nicole asked him to please 
go. He wouldn't leave without her. (R. 467/88). After Nicole was dressed they 
went outside to his truck. Nicole noticed Sherrie Norris driving by. Nicole 
motioned with her hand for her to keep driving. (R. 467/89). 
Nicole started walking down the sidewalk away from her house. The 
Defendant began yelling at her to come back. When she didn't go back he told 
her he was going to run into her car. (R. 467/91). Nicole turned and walked 
back to the Defendant's truck. (R. 467/91). When Nicole got back to the 
truck, the Defendant handed her his cell phone and told her Zach Leifson was 
on the phone. Nicole had met Zach on one prior occasion. She testified that 
Zach was one of the Defendant's "gang member brother, partners, friends." 
(R. 467/92). She asked Zach to tell the Defendant to leave her alone. (R. 
467/92). The Defendant took the phone back from her. (R. 467/93) 
They drove to Weber Canyon and then traveled east through Morgan 
County. (R. 467/95). While they were traveling, Nicole called another co-
worker to make sure her shift was covered because she was "terrified that I'd 
lose my job." (R. 467/96). While she was on the phone with her co-worker, 
the Defendant pulled out her pocketknife and told her if she did anything stupid 
she was going to get it. (R. 467/97). They also had a conversation where the 
Defendant told her he had a dream where he was going to kill her and then 
himself, and that's what he was going to do. (R. 467/101). 
The Defendant was running low on gas so he pulled into a gas station at 
Silver Creek Junction. (R. 467/99). Nicole told him that she needed to go to 
the bathroom. (R. 467/99). The Defendant made her promise she would return 
to the truck. When the truck stopped she opened the door and walked into the 
gas station. (R. 467/100). She walked into the bathroom and stayed in there 
for ten to fifteen minutes. (R. 467/100). She eventually walked out of the 
bathroom. The Defendant was standing by the counter. He approached her 
and said, "Come on, let's go." (R. 467/102). She said "okay" and he turned to 
walk out the door. She noticed that there were some steps and she ran up the 
steps as fast as she could go. (R. 467/103). 
There were some showers up the stairs, and Nicole hid in one of the 
showers. (R. 467/105). She was in the shower for approximately twenty 
minutes before she came out. (R. 467/106). She looked out a window and 
noticed the Defendant's truck pulling into one of the parking stalls. (R. 
467/108-9). She ran back into the shower and stayed there another twenty 
minutes. (R. 467/109). She looked out the window again and noticed the 
Defendant's truck driving away. (R. 467/109-10). 
She came down the stairs and was told by someone working at the 
counter that he was gone. She started bawling and then began calling friends. 
(R. 467/110). Eventually the police were called and someone picked up Nicole 
and took her to the Summit County Sheriffs Office. (R. 467/111-13). Nicole 
was questioned at the sheriffs office. She didn't want the Defendant caught so 
she spelled his name wrong. She didn't tell them anything about Justin 
Pedockie's involvement. (R. 467/113). 
There were pictures taken of Nicole at the sheriffs office. She had 
scratches on her neck and a mark above her eye. (R. 467/115). A friend 
picked her up from the sheriffs office and drove her back to Ogden. (R. 
467/117). The next day Nicole obtained a protective order. She was told by a 
judge that he wouldn't sign it unless she talked to someone at the Ogden Police 
Department, which she eventually did. About a week after that she talked to 
Detective Hansen from the police department. (R. 467/117-20). 
She was asked to fill out a written statement which she decided against 
doing. (R. 467/120). She eventually talked to Detective Hansen about what 
happened and agreed to give a written statement. (R. 467/121). 
Zach Leifson testified for the State. He knew the Defendant from prison 
where they were cellmates. (R. 467/209). Zach had talked to the Defendant on 
the phone during the time Defendant had Nicole. The Defendant told Zach that 
he had Nicole and it had gone wrong and asked what he should do. Zach told 
him to let her go and she wouldn't call the police. (R. 467/217). Zach also 
talked to Nicole. Zach testified that Nicole sounded scared, and she had said, 
"he's going to kill me. They tried to kill me. Help me." (R. 467/218). Zach 
told her to tell the Defendant that if he would let her go she wouldn't call the 
police. Zach testified that he thought this was good advice because if she 
called the police it would become "a whole gang situation." (R. 467/218-220). 
After Nicole had gotten away, the Defendant called Zach and told him 
he had some stuff he needed to get rid of. (R. 467/223). About an hour later 
the Defendant arrived at Zach's residence in Pay son. The Defendant had a pair 
of shoes, a phone, a pocket knife and a beanie that he wanted to get rid of. (R. 
467/226). The Defendant then drove Zach out to Zach's in-laws farm. The 
Defendant told Zach that he and Justin had taken Nicole out there to shoot her 
and they were going to drop her in the well and she tried to get away. (R. 
467/234-6). 
About a month later Zach called the Ogden Police Department and 
reported what the Defendant had told him. (R. 467/245). He met with 
Detective Hanson and gave a recorded statement. (R. 467/245-8). After Zach 
gave Detective Hanson the statement he decided to not cooperate with the 
State. He testified that this was the result of threats made against him. (R. 
467/248). 
Zach testified that Karen (the Defendant's wife) and Kami (Zach's ex-
wife and Karen's sister) told him that if he testified he'd die. (R. 467/249). 
These statements were objected to by defense counsel, but overruled. (R. 
467/248). Zach testified that he was worried because of "the gang." (R. 
467/250). 
Prior to the first trial Zach had been telling people that he wasn't going 
to testify. Karen had him sign a notarized statement that she said would get 
him out of testifying. (R. 467/254). Zach testified that he didn't write or read 
the statement. He testified that he just signed it. The statement read that he was 
threatened by the prosecutor that he would go back to prison if he didn't 
cooperate. The statement also says that he originally gave a false statement 
because he did not want to go back to prison. (R. 467/257). Zach testified that 
he signed the statement so the threats would go away. The first time he read 
the statement was at the first trial when the Defendant presented it to him to 
read. (R. 467/262-4). 
After the State finished questioning Zach, the jurors were allowed to ask 
questions. One of them asked Zach if he feared gang retaliation. He answered, 
"yes." (R. 467/271). 
Justin Pedockie also testified for the State. He testified that he and the 
Defendant grew up together until the Defendant went to prison. He testified 
that he was in on the plan to go to Ogden, kidnap Nicole, take her to Payson, 
put her in a well and shoot her. (R. 469/21). 
Justin was arrested and charged with Aggravated Kidnapping. (R. 
469/101). After he was arrested he gave a statement that they went to a hockey 
game and then went to Karen's and spent the night. (R. 469/102). After the 
preliminary hearing the State offered Justin a deal. They offered a plea bargain 
if he would cooperate with the State. (R. 469/103). The deal that was offered 
to Justin was that the first degree felony would be reduced to a class A 
misdemeanor, and the prosecutor would recommend no jail time. (R. 469/104-
06). 
As part of the deal, Justin had to make a statement to the detective. He 
later approached the prosecutor and told her that the statement wasn't correct. 
(R. 469/107). In the original statement Justin took most of the blame, and said 
it was his idea, that he was the one who was going to kill her. (R. 469/108). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. There 
were several instances where the trial court abused its discretion by allowing 
the State to introduce prejudicial evidence against the Defendant. The trial 
court allowed the State's witnesses to testify about Defendant's prior history of 
being in prison and being in a gang known for retaliation. This information 
was extremely inflammatory and certainly prejudiced the jury as evidenced by 
the questions to the witnesses as to whether they feared retaliation for 
testifying. This prior bad act evidence didn't help prove any of the non-
character elements envisioned by Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
and was only used to show that Defendant had a bad character and was acting 
in conformity therewith. 
When the trial court sentenced the Defendant the second time it didn't 
give him credit for time served. The first time the Defendant was sentenced 
the court gave him credit for time served. The second, more severe sentence, 
violated the Defendant's due process rights by punishing him more severely 
after he was successful in overturning his first conviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD 
ACTS. 
Prior to the trial, the Defendant filed a motion in limine. In the motion, 
the Defendant moved the court for an order prohibiting the State from 
discussing that Defendant had been in prison, had been on parole, was a 
participant with the Soldiers of Aryan Culture, that he had a history of 
domestic violence, or that he had solicited another person to threaten the 
alleged victim. (R. 646). 
The trial court did not issue written findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on this issue. The Court did rule from the bench and denied the 
Defendant's motion. In its ruling the trial judge stated; 
You know, normally evidence about him being in prison or on parole or 
belonging to SAC would not be relevant, but in this case it just seems it 
is because it explains how they met, why she was afraid of him, and I 
just - I don't know how you try the case because of the relationship and 
the setting in which they met and leave that out. It just - the jury is not 
going to have a correct picture of the relationship and what went on here. 
So I'm going to deny the motion in limine. 
It just seems to me it's being offered to explain how they were together, 
how they met, how they knew each other, what the relationship was, 
then it becomes extremely relevant in trying to figure out what she did, 
what he did, and why they reacted the way they did during the course of 
the kidnapping or the alleged kidnapping here. It also explains why she 
was afraid of the defendant, why she was afraid to call the police. And, 
again, it does seem to be relevant in this particular case. (R. 898/26-27) 
The State was allowed to introduce prior bad act evidence against the 
Defendant, and it became a central theme to the State's case. From the 
beginning of Nicole's testimony it was emphasized that Defendant was in 
prison when they met. (R. 467/58-63). She also testified that she was hanging 
out with people who were in and out of prison, and she knew "what they did to 
people who called the police, so I was scared." (R. 467/81-82). Nicole was 
asked if she feared retaliation. She answered; "Yeah. He was in a gang in 
prison, and I hung out with prior to this quite a few of the other people that 
were in the prison and I knew, you know, what they were all capable of doing 
and what they did to what they call snitches at the time." (R. 467/82). Nicole 
also testified that she contacted an individual named Casey Weaver. She 
contacted Mr. Weaver for advice because he was in the same gang as the 
Defendant. (R. 467/206) 
Zach Leifson was allowed to testify that he met the Defendant in prison 
when they were cellmates. (R. 467/209). Zach testified that he told Nicole to 
tell the Defendant that she wouldn't call the police. He thought this was good 
advice because if she called the police it would become "a whole gang 
situation." (R. 467/218-20). Zach testified that there was a time when he 
wasn't going to cooperate with the State because Defendant's wife and Zach's 
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ex-wife told him that if he testified he'd die. (R. 467/249). Zach testified that 
he was worried because of "the gang." (R. 467/250). 
Justin Pedockie testified that he grew up with the Defendant until the 
Defendant went to prison. (R. 469/8). After Justin finished testifying the 
jurors were allowed to submit questions and one of them asked Justin if he 
feared gang retaliation. He answered, that he did. He followed that up with 
"I—I don't fear it. I mean, I -I know that they want to, but I'm not afraid of 
them, I guess you would say. I don't care anymore." (R. 469/195-96) 
Defendant's attorney objected to the question and was apparently overruled at 
a sidebar before the question was answered. (R. 469/195-98) Likewise, jurors 
also submitted similar questions for Nicole and Zach. 
Nicole was asked if she still felt threatened. She answered, "Yeah. I do a 
lot of things to make sure that I'm safe all the time. (R. 468/233). Zach was 
asked if he feared gang retaliation today. He answered, uYes." (R. 467/271). 
This prior bad act evidence as well as the retaliation speculation was 
highly prejudicial to the Defendant. It only served to inflame the jury and show 
that he has a bad character. In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "this Court has repeatedly held that 
evidence of other crimes may not be admitted to prove that the defendant has a 
bad character or a disposition to commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets 
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002). 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy 
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably 
necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
at 1075. 
The Defendant's prior bad acts didn't help show any of the non-
character purposes envisioned by Rule 404(b). In State v. Feather son, 781 
P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that for prior bad acts to 
be admissible at trial, there had to be "a special relevance to a controverted 
issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's 
predisposition to criminality." Id. at 426. 
The fact that Defendant had been to prison and was in a gang had no 
relevance to the charge of Aggravated Kidnapping. The elements of 
Aggravated Kidnapping as they were listed in the Information are that the 
Defendant; intentionally or knowingly, without authority or law and against the 
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will of the victim, Jeanette Sather, by any means and in any manner seized, 
confined, detained, or transported the victim: 
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of the kidnapping, the actor 
possessed, used, or threatened to use a dangerous weapon as defined 
in Utah Code § 76-1-601; and/or did intentionally aid, assist, 
encourage, command, or solicit another to do the same. (R. 001). 
The fact that Defendant was in prison when he and Nicole met nor the 
fact that he was in a gang helped establish any of the elements of Aggravated 
Kidnapping. The State didn't need that evidence to prove any of the elements 
of the offense. How and where Nicole met the Defendant didn't assist the trier 
of fact in any way other than to show that Defendant had a questionable 
character. Furthermore, the fact that Defendant was in a gang was not relevant 
and did not assist the State in proving any of the elements. The speculative 
nature of retaliation was a constant theme that was extremely prejudicial to the 
Defendant. 
A. ANY PROBATIVE VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL 
EFFECT 
Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond proving mere 
criminal disposition, it is still subject to the protections of Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The 
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factors a court should consider when weighing the probative value of prior 
conviction evidence against its prejudicial effect are "the similarities between 
the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need 
for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id. 
The trial Court did not do a Rule 403 analysis. The Court failed to 
address the similarities between the Defendant's bad acts, the interval of time 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence and the effect the evidence 
would have on the jury. Since the trial court failed to engage in a Rule 403 
analysis, this Court should reverse Defendant's conviction. 
B. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ADMIT THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS INTO EVIDENCE. 
In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained must "be 
sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant in its absence." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 
(Utah 1989). In State v. Cox, this Court stated that "[ajlthough the State 
presented evidence on which might be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction, 
we are nevertheless persuaded that the jury may have reached a different result 
in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence of the prior sexual assaults." 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 7. 
Informing the jury that the Defendant had previously been to prison and 
was a member of gang that was known to retaliate was highly prejudicial. If 
the "taint" caused by inadmissible evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that 
there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict." State v. Mitchell, 
779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). Because the prior bad act evidence is so 
highly prejudicial, the Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the 
Defendant should receive a new trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DIDN'T 
RECOMMEND THAT DEFENDANT BE GIVEN 
CREDIT FOR THE TIME HE HAD SERVED. 
Following Defendant's first conviction he was sentenced on February 
12, 2003. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years to life at the 
Utah State Prison. The court also ran the sentence consecutive to a sentence 
the Defendant was already serving. (R. 901/8-10). The trial court also gave 
the Defendant credit for the time served. (R. 901/10). 
When the Defendant was re-sentenced following the reversal of his 
conviction by this Court and his subsequent jury trial, the trial court again 
imposed a ten year to life sentence to be run consecutive to the prior sentence. 
However, during the second sentence the trial court did not give the Defendant 
credit for the time served. This sentencing occurred on April 4, 2007. The 
Court was asked by the clerk if there was credit for time served. The trial 
judge specifically stated that there was to be no credit for time served. (R. 92/ 
20). In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Supreme Court 
held that when resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the judge from 
increasing the sentence if the increased sentence is motivated by 
vindictiveness. In State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed the requirements of due process and U.C. A. §76-3-
405. The Utah Supreme Court held that this section prevents the Utah 
constitutional right to appeal from being impaired "by imposing on a defendant 
who demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized 
with a harsher sentence for having done so." Id. at 180. 
U.C.A. §76-3-405 limits a defendant from receiving a harsher sentence 
following a successful appeal. It reads; 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or 
on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the 
same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct 
which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the 
prior sentence previously satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known 
to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court 
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the 
basis for the increased sentence. 
The State attempted to get the trial court to sentence the Defendant to an 
increased sentence of fifteen years to life. The prosecutor alleged that facts 
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that were not known to the trial court at the time of sentencing would justify an 
increased sentence. (R. 902/12-15). The trial court carefully considered those 
factors and found that there was no new information that would justify an 
increased sentence. (R. 902/16-20). 
However, after making that specific finding, the trial court did impose a 
sentence that was more sever than the first one. On February 12, 2003, when 
the Defendant was initially sentenced, he was given credit for time served. (R. 
901/10). On April 4, 2007, when the Defendant was sentenced the second time 
the Court refused to grant credit for time served. (R. 902/20). 
This resulted in a more severe sentence in two ways. First, the 
Defendant didn't receive credit for the time he was incarcerated waiting trial 
and sentencing. Second, due to the time frames associated with the appeal and 
second trial, over four years elapsed between the first and second sentences. 
By not receiving credit for the time served, the Defendant served an additional 
four years without credit for successfully winning the first appeal. Due process 
and Utah's statutory prohibition prevent such a result. "In the context of the 
due process requirement of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct 
2072, which seeks to assure that there is no chilling or deterring of the criminal 
defendant's exercise of his basic constitutional right to appeal, and in light of 
the Utah constitutional constraint against impairing the right to appeal, . . . we 
think the meaning of our statutory prohibition against a 'more severe' second 
sentence is clear. The second sentence cannot exceed the first in appearance or 
effect. . . ." State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384 |11 
Defendant's second sentence exceeded his first sentence. He did not 
receive credit for the initial time he was in custody awaiting the first trial, and 
then he lost an additional four years of credit as a result of his successful 
appeal. Due process prohibits such a result. For these reasons, the Defendant 
respectfully requests that if his conviction is upheld that the matter be 
remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
The State used improper character evidence throughout the Defendant's 
trial. This evidence was not relevant to any of the elements of Aggravated 
Kidnapping and was only used to show that Defendant had a bad character and 
acted in conformity therewith. This evidence was highly prejudicial and 
certainly could have impacted the jury's verdict. Based on these reasons, the 
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and grant 
him a new trial. In the alternative the Defendant asks this Court to remand the 
matter back to the trial court to have the sentence amended so that he receive 
credit for the time he has served. 
DATED t h i s \ day of March 2008. ^ 
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This is the time set for sentencing, scheduled one week early due 
to the defendant submitting a written letter demanding to be 
sentenced within 45 days. The defendant is present and represented 
by Stephen Laker, public defender. 
Brenda Beaton is present representing the State of Utah. It is 
noted that the State filed a sentencing brief, and the defense has 
not yet responded to the brief. Mr. Laker indicates that the 
defendant does not wish for him to speak at sentencing. 
The Court inquires as to whether the defendant wishes to be 
sentenced today or allow the defense time to respond to the State's 
brief. The defendant asserts that he desires to be sentenced today 
Case No: 011900689 
Date: Apr 04, 2007 
and does not wish to have a public defender. He further 
requests transcripts of all hearings, which the Court denies at 
this time, informing the defendant that he can request transcripts 
once a formal appeal has been filed. The defendant is informed he 
has 30 days from the date of sentencing to file 
an appeal. The Court declines to release the Public Defender's 
Association at this time, and this matter is passed so that Mr. 
Laker can discuss the contents of the presentence investigation 
report with the defendant. 
COUNT: 3:37 
Case is recalled. Attorney Beaton addresses the Court regarding 
the defendant's right to counsel or right to represent himself at 
sentencing. The defendant again asserts that he wishes to be 
sentenced today, and indicates he believes his 
constitutional rights were violated by his not being sentenced at 
the time his conviction entered. Attorney Beaton addresses the 
Court regarding the State's brief, and her argument that the Court 
impose a greater sentence of 15 years to life than was 
originally imposed. The Court denies the motion for a 
fifteen-to-life sentence, and imposes a sentence of ten 
years-to-life, to be served at the Utah State Prison. The sentence 
shall run consecutively with the sentence the defendant is 
currently serving 
and credit for time previously served is denied by the Court. The 
defendant: is further ordered uo pay full restitution in this case, 
to be determined by the Board of Pardons. 
(-C day of , -? jZn^A
 t 20 d 7 • /f Dated this _^ ^ .
^ 
.r-y^Ly^^ ^ 
ERNIE W JONES 
District Court Judge 
•n^^c n M =» of \ 
ADDENDUM B 
26 
do any good and won't make any sense. And, frankly, it would 
be a miscarriage of justice in terms of trying to get a jury 
to be impartial but to listen to the evidence and all of the 
evidence fairly. If they don't have it all to listen to then 
we have no way of knowing what kind verdict they will give us 
and we have no guarantee it will be just. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Barr? 
MR. BARR: Can I just respond on a couple of things? 
I think that's what the essence of what she's saying is we 
need to have this evidence so the jury knows who he is, 
that's what the character evidence is. That's the very 
purpose she wants to get it in there is character evidence, 
not because there's some motive or intent there. 
I think the other thing is — and what he's telling me 
regarding that other person and I don't know if we have to 
have another hearing regarding that, but it seems he says 
that this incident regarding the shooting of another man 
happened back in 1992. And it wasn't that he shot the girl 
or threatened the girl, which is what this case is about. 
And he also said it wasn't because it was a jealousy thing, 
it was a drug incident which is totally unrelated to what 
this case is about. So even if that's all so, then that 
should — has no relationship at all to what this case is 
about. 
THE COURT: All right. You know, normally evidence 
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aboat him being in prison or on parole or belonging to SAC 
would not be relevant, but in this case it just seems it is 
because it explains how they met, why she was afraid of him, 
and I just — 1 don't know how you try the case because of 
the relationship and the setting in which they met and leave 
that out. It just -- the jury is not going to have a correct 
picture of the relationship and what went on here. So I'm 
going to deny the motion in limine. 
It just seems to me it it's being offered to explain how 
they were together, how they met, how they knew each other, 
what the relationship was, then it becomes extremely relevant 
in trying to figure out what she did, what he did, and why 
they reacted the way they did during the course of the 
kidnapping or the alleged kidnapping here. It also explains 
why she was afraid of the defendant, why she was afraid to 
call the police. And, again, it does seem to be relevant in 
this particular case. 
On the question of the prior shooting, again, it goes to 
her knowledge and her mindset and how she felt about the 
defendant and why she was afraid and why she took his threats 
seriously when he said he was going to kill her because she 
knew about an earlier incident. It doesn't matter whether it 
was 1992. Her understanding was that he had tried to kill 
somebody else with a firearm and there are some real 
similarities between thau incident and what happened in this 
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case. So, again, I think it becomes relevant because it 
shows what's going on in her mind and her response to what 
he's doing. 
And finally, on the question of Paul Bushell, it seems to 
me that that is his testimony about being solicited by the 
defendant to threaten the victim, again, becomes relevant. 
And as I understand it, the defense is really not objecting 
to that as long as Mr. Bushell is here to testify. 
All right. Anything else on that motion that I need to 
address or clarify? 
MR. BARR: I guess — Your Honor, I was trying to 
listen to you, honestly, and he's whispering. 
THE COURT: I know. I know. 
MR. BARR: And I guess what he was whispering to me 
while you were talking is regarding the incident back 1992, 
he says his conviction was for possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. He did not get convicted of shooting this 
guy, it was aggravated or assault or anything like that, 
because it was a self-defense issue, it was regarding that he 
had a weapon. 
THE COURT: It's not the conviction that is 
critical. What is critical here is what she believed 
happened. And what she's saying is, hey, he went after 
somebody else with a shotgun and it had to do with a 
relationship with his girlfriend or ex-wife or whatever, and 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Let's see. This is State of Utah versus 
Robert Pedockie, case ending in 0689. And this is the time 
for sentencing on the charge of aggravated kidnapping. 
And, let's see, Ms. Neider, you're here on behalf of the 
State? 
MS. NEIDER: I am, Judge. 
THE COURT: And are you Ms. Preston? 
MS. PRESTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And, Ms. Preston, you've 
filed an appearance on this case? 
MS. PRESTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. This was the time set for 
sentencing, and we have Mr. Pedockie present. 
Did you get a copy of the presentence report? 
MS. PRESTON: Yes, we did. 
THE COURT: In fact, my recollection is this was 
actually scheduled for sentencing a couple of weeks ago and 
we set this over at your request; is thar right? 
MS. PRESTON: That's correct. Yes. 
THE COURT: So you could go over the report? 
MS. PRESTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Before we get started, let me just 
indicate, too — and I'll be glad to hear from both sides — 
but as I understand it, under the law this is a mandatory 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
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prison sentence. 
Is that your understanding? 
MS. PRESTON: That's — yes, that's our 
understanding. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Is there any legal 
reason why we shouldn't impose sentence? 
MS. PRESTON: No, there is not. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything you want to say as 
far as recommendations or comments? 
MS. PRESTON: Your Honor, I think the — counsel's 
advised me that the victim wants to address rhe Court, and 
we'd like to reserve -- reserve our — our brief statement. 
THE COURT: Do you want to hear from the victim 
first? 
MS. PRESTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. All right. Did the victim 
want to be heard then? 
MS. NEIDER: She does, Judge. She has a statement. 
I don't know if she's going to read it or --
THE COURT: All right. Did you want to come up, 
Ma'am? 
All right. Again, would you give us your name? 
MS. SATHER: It's Jeanette Nicole Sather. 
THE COURT: Jeanette? 
MS. SATHER: Uh-huh. 
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead, if you'd 
like. 
MS. SATHER: I just want to take a few moments to 
express how being the victim in this aggravated kidnapping 
case has affected me and my life. 
Every day I live with the fear that Pvobert has sent or 
will send someone to retaliate against me for turning him in. 
Because of this fear, I've put an alarm on my house and even 
gone to the extent of trying to sell my home and move away 
from Utah just to feel safe again. 
My ability to trust men has suffered immensely and this 
makes having a normal social life very difficult. It's been 
over two years and I still have nights that I don't sleep 
because of the fear Robert's created in my life and the 
nightmares I have of Robert and things he's done and said to 
me. I'm trying to work through some of these issues that 
he's caused in my life, but there are many memories that will 
not be able to -- that I will not be able to forget. 
Robert has expressed to others that if he's sent to 
prison because of what he did to me that he will kill me or 
have someone else take care of or hurt me. I honestly feel 
these threats are true. Robert has a strong history of 
violence and I feel that he will follow through with these 
threats. 
I feel if Robert is ever allowed to return to the 
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community, he will be violent again, if not towards me, to 
someone. And his next victim may not be as lucky as I and 
get away. 
Pxobert shot a man out of jealousy, kidnapped and almost 
killed me out of obsession and jealousy. I feel that he will 
eventually kill someone because of these dangerous 
personality traits. Robert should be locked away from 
society for a very long time so that he can be rehabilitated 
so he will not hurt or kill anyone else. 
Thank you for your time. 
THE COURT: All right. And, Ma1am, you understand 
what I said earlier? Under the law, it's -- a prison term is 
mandatory. He can't get probation on this case. 
MS. SATHER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Even if I wanted to give him probation. 
MS. SATHER: I understand. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that? 
MS. SATHER: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 
Did you want to make that part of the file then? 
MS. SATHER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. And, Ms. Neider, 
anything you wanted to add? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, just briefly. I know it's been 
quite a while since we have been here on this case in terms 
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report wrong? It says 
front page — 
THE COURT: As I read the statute, it says six, ten 
or 
MS. NEIDER: Fifteen. 
THE COURT: — fifteen. Yeah. 
MS. NEIDER: That is true, Judge. It is a six, ten, 
or a fifteen. And it's the State's position that -- that the 
Court should sentence him to ten to life, consecutive to the 
sentence that he's already serving down at the prison. I 
think that the prison — that will give them the opportunity 
to keep a handle on him for a very long period of time, which 
I think is necessary. 
The presumption is that it run consecutive because he 
was on parole, and I think that's -- there's no reason to 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 








deviate from that in this case, especially considering rhat 
he had only been on parole for about three and a half months. 
It wasn't that he had had an extended period of time that he 
had been behaving or anything like that. He had been out for 
a very short period of time, was adjusting, and I think went 
off the deep end in a significant way when it came to this 
case. I think the only way the Court could justify running 
anything concurrent would be to give him the 15 to -- 15 to 
life, concurrent. But it is the State's position that this 
case warrants a ten to life, consecutive. 
I think based on the history of this case that the 
Court's so familiar with that Mr. Pedockie has never 
expressed any remorse for what has happened. He has never 
apologized to the victim and I don't think he probably 
intends to do that today. He has been focused on working the 
system, manipulating the Court, manipulating the — the 
county attorney's office, in an attempt to try and make this 
go away. And -- instead of standing up for what has happened 
and really accepting responsibility for what he did that 
night. He's never done that. Judge, I think that that 
definitely counts against him. 
So the State's position is the ten to life, consecutive, 
and we would ask the Court to follow that. 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks, Ms. Neider. 
All right. Anything from the defense then, Ms. Preston? 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
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1 MS. PRESTON: We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Anything Mr. Pedockie wants to 
3 say or — 
4 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Well, as I mentioned before, 
6 it -- it seems clear to me under the statute that a prison 
7 term is mandatory as I read 76-5-302. And it also 
8 indicates — I think there was another section in the Code, 
9 76-3-406 that it says essentially the same thing: Probation 
10 shall not be granted for a conviction for aggravated 
11 kidnapping. The sentence can't be suspended. Judgment can't 
12 be entered for a lower category of offense. And 
13 hospitalization cannot be ordered under 76-3-406. 
14 So I — I suppose the only real questions are whether it 
15 be for a minimum of six, ten, or fifteen, and the other 
16 question is whether or not it run concurrent or consecutive. 
17 So I think based on the evidence that I've heard and the 
18 arguments presented, Mr. Pedockie, it will be the sentence of 
19 the Court then on the charge of aggravated kidnapping, a 
20 first degree felony, that you serve a minimum of ten years, 
21 not less than life. 
22 I'm going to base the ten-year minimum on the fact that 
23 a gun was used. I realize you didn't pull the trigger when 
24 the gun was fired, but as Ms. Neider pointed out, this victim 
25 is — is so lucky to be alive. I mean, anyone who saw the 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
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photographs, I mean, that bullet goes right through the back 
of uhe pickup, goes right through the seat where she's 
sitting, and how it ever missed her, it's just a miracle. 
But I think the fact that a firearm was used, and then I 
believe there was evidence that you had threatened her on 
several different occasions. You told her, you're dead; or 
if you don't go with me, you're going to be killed. I think 
there was some evidence about a knife, maybe a pocket knife 
being used or displayed, too. 
And I think for those reasons, the fact that the gun was 
used and there was threats made to her life, that the minimum 
of ten years is appropriate in this case. 
I am going to run this sentence consecutive, however, 
with the time you're already doing at the Utah State Prison. 
You — you hadn't been out of — or off — out of prison very 
long when this occurred. And so, obviously, you — you 
hadn't learned anything, I guess, from the last time you were 
there at the prison. So I'll run this sentence consecutive 
with the one you're already doing on the other offense. 
I'm also going to recommend that you be required to pay 
restitution for all expenses incurred as a result of this 
offense to the Office of Victim Reparation and for any 
out-of-pocket expenses that may have been incurred by the 
victim on this case for therapy. 
And I believe that's it. Anything else? 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
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MS. NEIDER: No, Judge. 
THE COURT: Anything else from the defense? 
MS. PRESTON: Your Honor, I just have a brief thing 
to address. Mr. Pedockie's requested that -- he requested 
transcripts for every proceeding that's -- not the trial 
transcripts, but all the other ones. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. PRESTON: And — a couple of months ago and he 
hasn't received those. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. PRESTON: And he plans to file a motion for a 
new trial, and so we need to have that expedited. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think if you'll 
just contact the court reporters, they can make arrangements 
and get you the transcripts for all the hearings. Okay? 
MS. PRESTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE CLERK: Credit for time served? 
THE COURT: Yeah. We'll give him credit for time 
served, 
MS. PRESTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MS. NEIDER: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Proceedings conclude.) 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
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Pedockie, it's case 
And, Mr. Laker, 
MR. LAKER: 
THE COURT: 
State, for both of 
MR. LAKER: 
THE COURT: 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
This is Srate of Utah versus Robert 
0689. 
you're here on his behalf? 
I am, Your Honor. 
And Ms. Beaton — or Mr. Daines for the 
you? 
They1re here anyway. 
They're here. All right. The reason I 
put this on the calendar is I think sentencing was actually 
set out a couple of weeks from now, but Mr. Pedockie sent us 
a letter indicating he wasn't willing to waive the 45 days 
and so I just asked my clerk to bring him up because he's 
entitled to be sentenced within 4 5 days. And I know, 
Mr. Laker, you have not had a chance to respond to the 
Stare's brief. 
MR. LAKER: That's correct, Your Honor. I just — 
in fact, I only saw it yesterday, last evening after -•-
THE COURT: So I guess the question is, does 
Mr. Pedockie want to be sentenced today or does he want to 
waive the 4 5 days now, give you a chance to respond to the 
State's brief and have us put sentencing on another date? 
MR. LAKER: Your Honor, I need to tell the Court 
that Mr. Pedockie has indicated to me that he has intention 
of hiring -- to handle the appeal of this case — 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: -- private counsel and thai he has 
reiterated to me that he doesn't want either myself or 
Mr. Barr to be representing him. That's all I know at this 
particular point in time. I know that I have not filed a 
response to the brief that was submitted by the prosecution. 
As I indicated, I only received that -- it was mailed on the 
26th. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: But we received it a couple of days 
after that, I believe. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess what I need to know, 
though, the answer to my question is, does he want to be 
sentenced today? Because under the law he has a right to be 
sentenced within 45 days. I got a letter from him saying he 
wasn't willing to waive that. I guess I need to know --
MR. LAKER: I think he's going to have to answer 
that question --
THE COURT: Mr. Pedockie, did you want — 
MR. LAKER: -- your Honor, because I can't for him. 
THE DEFENDANT: I just want it on my record that I 
want all my transcripts, videotapes, and mental health 
transcripts, everything I've asked Mr. Barr and I told you 
before the trial even started that these individuals weren't 
speaking in my behalf, that I actually wanted to fire them 
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and you made me proceed with these individuals, that I have a 
conflict of interest --
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: — in already. So, yeah, I don't 
even want him to speak in my behalf. 1 just want all my 
transcripts from day one, from the rest, all the way and 
video cameras of the trial and everything like that. I've 
asked several times and I have not gotten any response or any 
response from any of the --
THE COURT: Well, see, you don't have to worry about 
it until once your sentenced, then you've got 30 days to file 
your appeal. The time doesn't run until after you're 
sentence so that's where we're at right now. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, let's get it going so I can 
get the appeal on the way. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I want to know is that 
under the law you have — 
THE DEFENDANT: And you guys violated my 
constitutional rights and I want to be sentenced. I asked to 
be sentenced the day of trial when it was over and I don't 
even know why you proceeded to let these individuals to talk 
in my behalf. 
THE COURT: So you want to be sentenced today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. The State want to be heard? I 
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know we originally were thinking about that and then you said 
you wanted to brief it. I've got ,your brief. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I also --
THE COURT: Do you want to proceed with sentencing 
today? 
MS. BEATON: We're fine with sentencing today. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I also want a copy of 
the sentencing today too. 
THE COURT: That's why we have the court reporter 
here so --
THE DEFENDANT: No. I want a copy of the — because 
I want to show vindictiveness of how she's trying to up the 
ante on this which is violating my other rights for appeal. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you get a copy of the 
presentence report, Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: I did not, YTour Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: I think that went to — probably went to 
Mr. Barr. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. LAKER: And I just want -- for clarification, I 
think Mr. Pedockie does not want me to speak in his behalf in 
any way, shape or form. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I've heard that but I'm not 
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he wants to go forward 
with sentencing. 
MS. BEATON: Well, maybe, your Honor, if I could 
just speak to that one issue for just one second. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. BEATON: The story I had originally heard was 
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THE DEFENDANT: I didn't say that. 
MR. LAKER: That's not what I said. , I said that he 
intends to hire him to handle the -- if it proceeds 
forward -- from this point forward and then he did not want 
us, Mr. Barr and myself, to represent him. 
THE COURT: I guess the question is, does he want 
him here for sentencing or does he just, want him on on appeal 
or do we know? 
MR. LAKER: I think he just wants him here on the 
appeal. 
MS. BEATON: Well, even as to the appeal I talked to 
him about that because I -- because his name keeps creeping 
into this case on a regular basis, and during the trial he 
indicated that Mr. Skordas was going to come up and represent 
him pro bono. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. BEATON: I've never spoken with Mr. Skordas with 
regard to that because I obviously had other things to do 
while we were in the middle of the trial, but I asked him 
today whether or not that was the case and he said that the 
defendant's family had contacted him, he has never been 
retained as counsel to handle the trial. He said he did have 
a conversation with them that indicated that if the trial was 
set, he knew from previous dealings with you that you would 
not be inclined to continue the trial but they said they 
1 never retained him anyway. I asked Mr. Skordas whether or 
2 not he would have been willing to do it on a pro bono basis 
3 because that was the representation we had from the defendant 
4 during the course of the trial, and he said absolutely not. 
5 I then asked him whether or not he had been retained to 
6 handle the sentencing today. He said no. He said he had 
7 been contacted again and they wanted to know whether or not 
8 he would handle the appeal. He said that he has been 
9 contacted once a while back, has never been contacted again 
10 by the family and he has not been retained. He has no 
11 intention on entering on behalf of this defendant. 
12 MR. LAKER: At least at this point. 
13 MS. BEATON: Well, I didn't get that impression, but 
14 all right. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Okay. 
16 MS. BEATON: And I guess the only issue that 
17 Mr. Daines and I have with this is I agree if the defendant 
18 wants to be sentenced today. I think that he, like he does 
19 at the trial, has the ability to say I want to proceed on my 
20 own or if he thinks that he wants to have an attorney 
21 represent him and he wants to retain somebody, we think he 
22 has that right, but obviously it can't be done today because 
23 he has not retained counsel. But in terms of forcing 
24 Mr. Laker to represent him on the sentencing, although it 
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THE DEFENDANT: I want to be sentenced today but I 
don't think it is any of the prosecutor's business what, how 
or who I'm going to obtain for a legal counsel and what my 
family's done, you know what I mean? 
THE COURT: All right. I just think if he wants to 
be sentenced, that's what the law says, he can be sentenced 
within 45 days, so let's go ahead.and go through with it. I 
just want to make sure I've got it clear on the record that 
that's what he wants do. 
THE DEFENDANT: Because, Your Honor, what she said 
is not true, that's why I don't think — 
MS. BEATON: Mr. Skordas said he was available by 
telephone if the Court wanted to put him on a telephone 
conference call as well. 
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THE DEFENDANT: Because me and my dad was going to 
sit down -- .1 didn't even know we had court today and roday 
was the day we were going to talk to see if we were going to 
retain him. 
THE COURT: And that's why the question. Do you 
want to talk to Mr. Skordas — 
THE DEFENDANT: I want to be sentenced. I was 
wanting to be sentenced before, the day of trial --
THE COURT: I know. 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't even want to continue it. 
You guys already violated — I wanted to be sentenced that 
day. 
THE COURT: Well, you have the right to be sentenced 
in 45 days. You don't necessarily have a right to be 
sentenced on the day you were convicted. 
THE DEFENDANT: I want to be sentenced within 4 5 
days . 
THE COURT: Okay. And that's where we're at right 
now. So you don't want to talk to Mr. Skordas and you don't 
want to talk to somebody else before sentencing, right? 
THE DEFENDANT: My phone at the prison aren't even 
working now due to the fact that — I believe it's due to the 
fact that the prosecutor keeps messing around with it and 
listening to it because my phones won't even accept ~-
THE COURT: That's not my question. The question is 
11 
you don't want to talk to Mr. Skordas or another attorney? 
THE DEFENDANT: I just want to be sentenced. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I -chink we've made a 
clear record then. Okay. 
All right. Mr. Laker, any legal reason sentence should 
not be imposed? 
MR. LAKER: Not on a legal basis. 
THE COURT: Do you have anything you want to say on 
his behalf? 
MR. LAKER: Only, Your Honor, that the 
recommendation is pretty much identical to what it was 
previously. 
THE COURT: Which was the wrong recommendation. It 
was a five to life, which doesn't apply to this case. 
MR. LAKER: It doesn't apply. 
THE COURT: Which make me wonder if AP&P doesn't 
just pick up their old presentence report and run it off. 
MR. LAKER: The only thing I would say and I only 
say this intentionally is that that I — I don't think the — 
that there have been additional facts presented that would 
justify increasing it, and with that I'll --
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pedockie, anything you 
want to say? I take it that's a no? 
All right. Ms. Beaton? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. I — just like I said, I don't 
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trust these attorneys and I would like to have an attorney 
but I want to be sentenced so I can get this on the road. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. State want to be 
heard, Ms. Beaton? 
MS. BEATON: We do, Your Honor. You had already 
indicated that you received the State's sentencing brief. 
THE COURT: I have. 
MS. BEATON: The issue before the Court today is 
whether or not this ought to be a 6, 10 or 15 commitment and 
whether or not that charge should run consecutive or 
concurrent to the current sentence that the defendant is 
already serving at the Utah State Prison. 
At this point, it is the State's position, as I'm sure 
you've read, that the State believes that the sentence should 
be 15 to life to run consecutive to the sentence that he has 
now. I'm speaking on behalf of the State of Utah, I'm 
speaking on behalf of the Ogden City police department who 
investigated this case, and certainly I'm speaking on behalf 
of the victim in this case, Nicole Sather. 
I also had a conversation with Ms. Neider who was here, 
and although she's not with the county attorney's office 
anymore, I indicated to her what our position was. She has 
been aware of the fact that we think there was an error early 
on when this was originally sentenced. And she had indicated 
that it was fine with her if I indicated to the Court that 
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she does, in fact, think that the appropriate sentence as 
well would be 15 to life consecutive, given the nature of the 
facts of this particular case, given the history that this 
defendant has, and given the nature of who this defendant is 
and in weighing the aggravating versus the mitigating 
factors. 
Now, the law ordinarily says that you can't impose an 
increased sentence and I know that was a concern that the 
Court had initially when we dealt with this. I've provided i 
the Court a copy of the statute that governs this particular 
issue. If the Court looks at the additional 16 factors that 
the State has presented for you and you conclude at the end 
of the day that, one, you think those factors are aggravating 
in this particular case; and two, you think those are factors 
that you did not know when you originally sentenced this 
defendant in 2003, you have uhe ability at this point in time 
to impose the 15 to life. 
Now, the issue as to whether or not it runs concurrent or 
consecutive, it is the State's position that that 
determination has been made and it was accurately made the 
first time. The defendant was on parole and had only been on 
parole for approximately three and a half months before he 
did this. In fact, that would be an aggravating factor that 
the Court could have considered in determining whether the 
medium level is imposed which would be the 10 to life or the 
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aggravated level in which it would be imposed at the 15 to 
life. 
I'm not going to reiterate all of the aggravating factors 
but I have listed out the aggravating factors that I believe 
the Court to have known in 2003. The State was only able to 
come up with two mitigating factors that you knew of in 2003 
which the State's conclusion is, is that the aggravating 
factors in 2003 far outweigh the mitigating factors in 2003, 
but then we've also given you more details about what was 
going on, because some of you it you heard during the course 
of the second trial, some of you didn't know about it because 
adult probation and parole didn't tell you about it or 
Ms. Neider didn't discuss it with you in any further detail. 
But at this point in time, you have a copy of the crime that 
the defendant had been committed to the Utah State Prison 
with. 
The defendant at this point in time now qualifies as a 
habitual violent offender where he did go out and commit any 
other sort of violent offense. And certainly the nature of 
the violent offense that the defendant had been committed on 
and had been on parole on at the time that he committed this 
crime in 2001, the State certainly thinks is an aggravating 
factor that the Court should have known more about when you 
sentenced him in 2003 in which we've certainly given you 
ample indication of what was going on in 2007 because I 
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actually provided both you and defense counsel a copy of the 
police reports that talked about that. 
I also drew the conclusion that there were similarities 
between those two particular crimes indicating that the 
defendant is not only a repeat offender in this type of — 
type of type — this similar type of crime, but also 
demonstrated the similarity in these two different types of 
crimes that were going on, and then the State went on to 
describe other factors totaling 16 different factors that we 
think that you and ultimately the Board of Pardons ought to 
consider when you determine when the defendant ought to be 
released on this crime. 
Certainly it is the State's position that this defendant 
is a danger to the community, the type of crime he committed 
is the type that ordinarily he ought to be sentenced to a 15 
to life, and we would ask that that be the sentence that you 
impose today. 
THE COURT: Ms. Beaton, does the victim want to be 
heard today at the time of sentencing? 
MS. BEATON: She had indicated to me today that she 
knows that you had the ability to listen to what she said in 
2003 and you also got to hear what 
that we had in 2007, she wanted — 
the comments that she made at that 
that she!s supportive of the State 
she testified to at trial 
assuming that you remember 
time, and fully realizing 
' s position that the 
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defendant be sentenced at the 15 to life consecutive, those 
are the things she wanted you to know and she didn't think it 
was necessary to speak again today. 
THE COURT: All right. I might indicate I did have 
a chance to go back and look at the transcript for 
sentencing. In fact, I think it was part of your exhibit was 
the sentencing, so that kind of helped me remember what was 
said at the time of sentencing both by the victim, defendant, 
and also the prosecutor, Ms. Neider, so that was very helpful 
to be able to see what information was provided at the time 
of sentencing. 
You know, this is a difficult call, because as I read the 
statute, the defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping 
and he was sentenced to 10 to life and that sentence was 
consecutive. I imposed that sentence on February the 12th of 
2003. Ultimately the conviction was overturned by the 
Supreme Court and it was sent back for a retrial. He was 
convicted again on February the 20th of 2007, then, of 
course, the issue then became could I increase the sentence 
from 10 to life up to 15 to life. And I think the statute 
that applies here, of course, is 76-3-405 and the general 
rule is pretty well known and that's the one I relied upon 
which was that you may not -- a judge may not increase the 
sentence on a retrial. You can impose a more severe 
sentence -- because what it appears to be on the surface is 
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that if I increase the sentence that somehow I'm being 
vindictive because he appealed his conviction. 
The only exception in there is if there are facts that 
were not known to the Court at the time of the original 
sentence, and that's what I'm struggling with is trying to 
decide whether or not I knew or had access to facts at this 
sentence that I did not have at the time of the original 
sentence. And I just want to maybe just take a minute and go 
through some of the facts, the aggravating factors. 
One of the facts that the State raised was that I now had 
more of the details of what happened on his mayhem charge, 
the one that occurred in January of 1990 where he shot a man 
in the leg and I guess ultimately the man's leg had to be 
amputated and it had to do with a woman. Very similar to 
this situation, apparently he was jealous and got mad at this 
guy and shot him in the leg and bashed in the windows of her 
car. But what I do recall, and I wrote it down, is when I 
looked at the transcript and that was that the victim, 
Ms. Sather, had talked about that at the time of the original 
sentencing. She may not have given us the same details that 
we had now, but there certainly — I knew about the fact that 
he had a prior conviction, I knew generally what that 
conviction involved, the mayhem charge in 1990. So I'm not 
sure that's a new -- a new fact, something that I was not 
aware of. 
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The other aggravating factors that you talk about are the 
tampering with the witness where Nicole was threatened in 
January of 2001, the threats that were made to Justin 
Pedockie and Zach Leifson, it appears that that seems to be 
kind of a never-ending battle. 
As I recall in the first trial, all of these people 
mentioned they had been threatened. And again, in 2007 when 
we do the second trial, again the victims had been 
threatened. The problem I'm having is trying to link that to 
the defendant. There's no question somebody's calling, 
somebody is contacting witnesses and telling them not to 
testify, but I don't know if this is just a friend or a 
relative that is just doing this on their own, or whether 
Mr. Pedockie put them up to it. But from what I gather, I 
don't remember anybody ever saying that it was Mr. Pedockie 
who actually called and threatened. In fact, I think Nicole 
was threatened by a guy named Paul Bushell according to my 
notes. So, again, I'm having trouble saying that this is a 
new fact that is attributed — it certainly would benefit 
Mr. Pedockie if he was able to convince witnesses not to 
testify, but I don't know that he actually did that. 
The other aggravating factor was the recantation by Zach 
Leifson on April 19th of 2002. Again, that's before he was 
ever sentenced on the first case, so again, I'm not sure 
that's new evidence, something new and different to increase 
19 
the penalties. 
The one^ thing uhat was new was the sham marriage, I 
guess, as referred to by the State by Karen where she was 
going to be a witness and then they hurried and got married 
so the State couldn't call her, but she never testified. So 
I don't know even if that marriage is a sham, I don't know 
that it made any difference other than it just shows the type 
of person we're dealing with. But since the jury never got 
to hear her testimony, I don't know if it makes any 
difference whether or not they got married and for what 
reason. So, again, I don't think that was important. 
The fire that occurred at the victim's home. I did know 
about the fire at the time of the original sentence which 
occurred in November of 2002 and he wasn't sentenced until 
2003. So, again, I just don't think that's a new — a new 
fact that I could consider. 
And, finally, one of the things the State talks about is 
the defendant's ability to try to manipulate the court 
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THE CLERK: Credit for time served? 
THE COURT: No. Not from me, no. 
THE CLERK: So no credit? 
THE COURT: No credit for time served. 
MS. BEATON: And it!s consecutive? 
THE COURT: It's consecutive. Uh-huh. All right? 
Any other questions? 
MS. BEATON: I think there was a restitution amount. 
THE COURT: Oh, there was a restitution. And I will 
require that he be responsible for restitution. But I don't 
show an amount here. Do you? So this would be all 
restitution incurred by the victim in the case. 
MS. BEATON: $408.92 was paid by the Victim's 
Reparations Fund. 
THE COURT: All right. Is that the only figure that 
21 
you're aware of 408? 
(Ms. Beaton consults with the victim.) 
MS. BEATON: She's talking about time lost from work 
as a result of being here. 
THE COURT: I don't know, can you recover that? I 
know you couldn't at one time. 
MR. LAKER: I still don't think you can. 
THE COURT: I wish we could but I don't think we 
can. All right. That will be the order then. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, can I get a copy of the 
sentencing paper today? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Just contact the clerk and 
they'll get it to you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I get a copy today so I can — 
THE COURT: You understand you've got 30 days from 
today — 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I want it on record I am 
appealing this right now. I want it on record right now. 
THE COURT: It is. It's on the record. 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, Tracy A. Covington, do certify that I am a Registered 
Professional Reporter and Official Court Reporter in and for 
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